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Abstract 
The hypothesis that the Duverger's Law can be extended to plurality multi member district 
elections received some empirical support in Steven Reed's (1990) study of the Japanese elections. 
Here we return to electoral data of Japan and Taiwan in order to find evidence consistent with the 
theoretical result offered in Part I of this essay, namely, th�t. cohesive electorates should witness either 
the competition among as many "serious" candidates as there are seats, or, at most, one "extra" 
candidate. per _race. We also compare the consistency of the data with_ two alternative sets of
predictions, one - derived from our candidate-based model (strategic candidates; sinc�re voters),
lnother - proposed by Gary Cox (1993) where strategic voter behavior is analyzed. The indications 
are that the strategic role of the candidates should be viewed ·as leading. 
* I would like to thank Peter Ordeshook, Rod Kiewiet and Elizabeth Gerber for their help and 
�uggestions. I have also benefited from discussions with John Campbell, Matthew Shugart, and Skip 
Lupia. I also wish to thank Gary Cox and Emerson Niou for access to their data. Remaining errors 
are my own. 
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Building on the theoretical results presented in Part I of this paper, here we examine Japanese 
and Taiwanese election data to assess the existence of stable patterns in the number and relative 
electoral strength of candidates at the district level. At the same time we contrast the empirical 
support that our predictions receive against that received by the predic;tions of a "rival" 
conceptualization - the one offered by Cox (1993), which focuses on voters as strategic actors rather 
than candidates. Generally, the empirical evidence indicates the stronger impact of the strategic 
behavior of candidates on patterns of competition; On the other hand, that support is not so strong 
as to lead us to .restrict ourselves to models based exclusively on sincere voting. It is clear that strategic
voting must be an important consideration as well. 
In the next section we discuss why studying elections in multimember districts is different 
from studying those in single-member districts, and how such studies advance our knowledge of 
electoral behavior in general. In Section 2 we state the competing hypotheses, which differ both in 
terms of predicted number of candidates within a district and the distribution votes among them. 
Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to �he analysis of J�panese electoral data. SeGt�on 3 looks at the number. 
of candidates, while Section 4 deals with the distribution of votes. Section 5 offers a parallel analysis 
of Taiwanese elections. Finally, in Section 6 we attempt to project theoretical findings on the role and 
operation of political parties. 
1. STUDYING MUL TIMEMBER DISTRICT ELECTIONS
Few theoretical results have been accumulated about how electoral systems work when there 
is more than one legislative seat to be filled per district. This lack of theory, in contrast to the well 
developed conceptualizations of single-member district elections, is explainable not only by the 
prevalence of the later case in American politics, but also by the exploding strategic complexity of 
multi-seat elections. However, it is the multimember district case that may play a decisive role in 
improving our general understanding of the true nature of the electoral game. Specifically, in deciding 
how to approach theorizing about elections, we must often ask one primary question: how much 
attention should we pay to strategic choice among voters versus among candidates. 
Ideally, of course, we would want to consider both forms of strategic behavior. Unfortunately, 
in most multi-candidate election systems, doing so results in unmanageable analytic complexity. Thus, 
in examining the implications of a particular election law, it is useful to learn whether that law 
impacts electoral outcomes primarily through the strategic calculations of voters or that of candidates. 
If, as in the case here, we are interested in predicting the number of candidates or parties likely to 
compete as a function of district magnitude or allocation rule, should we focus on the possibility that 
voters will act strategically by voting for candidates other than those who rank highest on their 
preference order? Or, are we better served by supposing that voters act sincerely and by focusing 
instead on candidates who choose policy platforms in anticipation of the fact that competitors enter 
the contest whenever doing so is profitable? 
At least for SNTV multi-member district elections, Reed (1990) and Cox. (1993) suggest that 
the implications of voter and candidate rationality can be separated in terms of the number of 
candidates competing and the vote shares they obtain. What we require, though, are partial 
equilibrium models that provide the requisite empirically testable hypotheses that rigorously 
differentiate between the two ass·umptions of voter and candidate strategic action. Cox (1993)
provides an appropriate analysis when voters are strategic and candidates are mere mannequins. In 
contrast! the model offered in Part I of this essay lets candidates be.strategic (by granting them spatial 
mobility and by allowing them to choose whether or not to compete), and assumes that they compete 
for the votes of sincere Downsian voters.1 
2. DISCRIMINATING HYPOTHESES
As Part I of this essay shows, the difference between the predictions of these two models 
concerns both the number of candidates that compete i0n equilibrium and the way i.n which the vote 
is divided among them. In Cox's model, the difference in the vote for the k winning candidates 
(where k is district size) should be minimal - all such candidates should receive equal electoral 
support. Furthermore, the electoral support of all vote-getting losers must be the same, lower than 
that of the last winner and should eventually drop to zero as one moves down the list. Insofar as· the 
number of-candidates is concerned, this number should be at least k+l. In contrast, our model predicts 
the equilibrium number of candidates being either k or k+l in a non-polarized constituency (i.e., if 
the distribution of preferences is unimodal). No prediction is made about the relationship among the 
1 . Employing a simple Nash argument in a static context allows us to draw a line between things
that can and cannot be if the system is in equilibrium. 
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vote shares of the winners, but in the k+l case the last winner and the first looser should enjoy 
approximately the same share of the vote. 2 
Thus, if we indicate the number of votes received by candidate i. i=l ... k •.. n as vi (where k is 
the number of seats to be filled in a district, and where i is the rank of a candidate within that 
district), then the two hypotheses we want to test are as follows: 
HI (Cox's): 
H2 (ours): 
Al: vi= vk+l, or vi= 0 for all i > k, and 
Bl: vk/v1 = 1. 
A2: k or k+l candidates compete with v1 � ... � vk, and 
B2: In the case of k+l candidate competition, vk+l /vk = ·l.
Represented graphically, the two hypotheses are compared in Figure I. Cox's hypothesis 
implies a uniformly distributed vote up to the last winning candidate. After k, the vote declines to 
some vk+l, where it stays until it drops all the way to zer? at some j > k+l (the exact location of j will 
depend on the preference structure within the constituency). In contrast, our hypothesis does not 
preclude' the decline of the vote in the set of w'inn·ers - up to the kth candidate. But for those ·races 
where more than k candidates compete, our candidate-based model predicts a flat portion in the 
distribution of the vote between the kth and k+1•t candid�tes, after which the vote should drop to 
zero, i.e. no other electorally motivated candidates in excess of k+l should exist. Of course, since 
things other than electoral motivation may activate some candidates;· it is sufficient to establish that 
a "sharp" decline in the vote between the k+1•t and k+2nd candidates makes the later a "non-serious" 
competitor. 
With this structure to our empirical analysis we can focus on the two most straightforward 
products of an election: the number of competing candidates and the distribution of vote among them. 
2 It is appropriate here to recall what assumptions were made in Part I, and what assumptions 
underlie Cox's model. We require that: I) voters have single-peaked preferences over a one­
dimensional policy space, and vote sincerely for the candidates nearest their ideal points; 2) each 
candidate maximizes his/her probability of winning a seat; 3) candidates can adjust their spatial 
positions, and a new candidate can enter, but only if doing so secures a positive probability, and 4) 
any two candidates must be spatially separated by a minimal distance � > 0. In addition to derive the 
results we require the voter· ideal points in the district to be continuously, unimodally and 
symmetrically distributed. Cox when developing a voter-based model assumes that: 1) number of 
candidates is finite, and their policy platforms are fixed; 2) there is at least one voter for each possible 
preference configuration (only strict preference ranking is allowed); 3) voters vote strategically, 
maximizing their expected utility; 4) distribution of voter preferences is common knowledge, and all 
voters have identical expectations about the number of votes each candidate is going to receive. 
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However, we emphasize that it is not our intention to select any single hypothesis at the expense of 
another. Rather, it is to study how HI and H2 interact and when relying on one or another better 
serves our purposes. Again, because both sets of results are based on stringent assumptions, we are 
not in the position to reject the validity of either model. Whenever evidence does not support a 
hypothesis, an argument can be made that it is due to the specific set of assumptions not being met 
by the data. With this qualification in mind, we turn first to Japanese electoral data, since Japan over 
the post-war period has accumulated a large body of internally consistent electoral information 
(consistent in the sense of district boundaries being largely unaltered and electoral rules largely 
unchanged).3 
3. THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES
Measurement problems: In developing his hypotheses about the number of "serious" candidates that 
compete in Japanese legislative elections, Reed counts candidates by computing their "effective" 
number, where this number corresponds to the inverse of a sum of the candidates' squared shares of 
the vote: 
EN=�=l/E (vote1)2 
F . i (vote.in the dis tr ic;t) 2 
EN, then, is the i�verse of a fractionalization index F, that, for the same number of candidates, 
increases as the candidates' vote shares become .more uneven. The minimum of F for a given number
of candidates is. attained when .their vote shares are identical. At thi.s point EN equals the actual 
number of contestants. But this circumstance corresponds to EN's maximal value, so that for all other 
distributions of votes, the "effective" number of candidates assumes a value below _the "real" number 
(with the bias increasing as differences in the candidates' vote shares increase). 
Although convenient in some applications, "effective" counting does not help us study the 
behavior of candidates in the present context. A downward bias may be produced by differences in 
the vote for the highest ranked winners, whereas our attention is directed at competition down the 
line - among the lower ranked winners, losers, and potential entrants. In fact, the downward bias of 
the "effective" measure can be so significant, that it can result in counting fewer candidates than there 
are seats in the district. Consider an example where district magnitude equals four, and five 
candidates receive votes in a following proportion: 
3 Data is taken from: Reed, Steven, Japan Election Data: The House of Represematives, 1947-
1990, Ann Arbor, Center for Japanese Studies, 1992. Electoral data on 1993 Japanese elections are 
courtesy of Professor Gary Cox, University of California at San Diego. 
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candidate 1: 40% 
candidate 2: 20% 
candidate 3: 16% 
candidate 4: 12% + e 
candidate 5: 12% - e 
Despite the fact that candidates 3, 4 and 5 are competing closely for the last seat, the "effective" 
measure that Reed employs returns the value EN= 3.93, which is less than k and which leads to the 
loss of the very candidate whose behavior interests us most - the k+1•t candidate. There is, moreover, 
nothing extraordinary in the distribution of the vote in this example. Consider Japan's Niigata 3rd
District in 1972: 
Tanaka Kakuei 
Kobayashi Susumu 
Miyake Shoichi 
Murayama Tatsuo 
.. Ono lchiro 
Furukawa Hisashi 
Magai Hideji 
182681 
58217 
. 55363 
48329 
39867 
30747 
18944 
The "effective" number of candidates in this race, 4.22, is less than the size of the district. Similarly, 
in the Kagawa 2nd District, in 1980, we have for the three seats being filled,
Morita Hajime 
Kubo Hitoshi 
Kato Tsunetaro 
Kubo Fumihiko 
other candidates 
EN=2.28 is again below district size. 
151546 
44027 
34535 
9829 
3016 
Not only can EN conceal competition, it can indicate competitiveness where it is not present. 
For instance, Japan's Communist Party has a policy of running a candidate in each district regardless 
of his or her chances of electoral success. In the majority of cases these chances are zero. EN, though, 
often counts these candidates despite their electoral hopelessness. For example, in the Toyama 2nd
District in 1972: 
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Kataoka Seiichi 
Watanuki Tamisuke 
Sano Kenji 
Yoshida Minoru 
Arima Shigekazu 
76522 
64950 
62954 
62355 
9769 
Competition for the last seat clearly occurs here, but the fifth candidate is not part of it. Nevertheless, 
EN=4.27, which indicates more than k+l relevant candidates. 
Reed (1990) employs EN to avoid an arbitrary definition of "serious" candidates. But because 
"effective" counts do not carry the information we need, we must find a more satisfactory way to 
divide candidates into serious and non-serious categories. To that end notice that to the ·extent that
competition among losing candidates focuses on the last seat in the district, we might expect such 
candidates to win comparable shares of the vote. Hence, if we order all candidates in the descending 
order of their vote, a sudden "significant" drop in the vote among the losers would indicate the end 
of the string of '.'serious" candidates (corresponding to the predicted drop in the distribution of the 
vote, as in Figure l ). The arbitrary thing to decide with this approach, though, is exactly how 
significant this drop should be .. Since we have no theoretical basis for operationalizing "significant"
one way or another, we suggest marking this drop after the candidate whose nearest competitor is 20, 
33, or 50 percent behind him in terms of vote shares. Of course, that competitor should also be among 
the losers, as we assume that victorious candidates compete not among themselves, but with those 
without legislative seats. 
Figure 2a shows the frequencies by the year with which a 20-percent drop in the vote occurs 
immediately after the kth candidate, after the k+l8t, k+2nd, k+3rd, or later candidate (Figures 2b and 
2c consider respectively the location of the first 33-percent and 50-percent drop in the vote). A 
substantial portion of districts supports only as many competitive candidates as there are seats, 
whereas the dominant number of districts has just one competing candidate in excess of district size. 
If we now take the number of candidates before the vote becomes non-competitive (i.e. drops 
substantially for the first time outside the set of winners) as a measure of the number of "serious" 
candidates, then Figure 2 allows us to make certain preliminary observations supportive of hypothesis 
H2. For example, we are interested in detecting the presence of a k-equilibrium in which the vote 
drops significantly immediately outside the set of winners. Reed's analysis does not make allowances 
for this possibility, whereas Cox predicts it will not happen. According to our model, however, it can 
occur for certain types of voter preference distributions. Hence, if we observe a persistent presence 
of k-candidate races, then we have one argument in favor of a candidate-based model. In Figure 2, 
then, we see that when the 20% criterion is applied, k-candidate races take place in 20 to 30 percent 
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of all electoral districts. The combined weight of k and k+l candidate races by the same criterion lies 
- in different years - between 65% (in 1969) and 87% (in 1980, 1986, and 1990).
Naturally, strengthening the threshold of candidate "seriousness" increases the number of 
counted candidates in the race, so from one diagram to another the-shift should be toward the greater 
weight of the higher count. But the very presence of k-candidate elections even with a threshold of 
50 percent means that in up to I 0 percent of all races the vote drops by more than one half 
immediately after the last winning candidate (and in some cases the drop in the vote is as significant 
as 70-80 percent or more). The combined weight of k and k+l races by this stronger criterion is 
between 33% (in 1958) and 67% (in 1980).
The pattern of one or fewer extra candidates/district: The average number of "serious" 
candidates in excess of district size is shown by the years of elections (1958 to 1993) in Figure 3. 4 
Notice that with the relatively liberal 20% criterion, almost exactly k+l candidates compete on 
average, whereas with the more stringent 50% criterion this number still does not go above k+2 in all 
but two elections. 6 
Our way of counting "serious" candidates is, probably, unfavorable to the hypothesis we 
advocate. Specifically, comparing the vote of each loser to the vote of the candidate immediately 
ahead of him may result in counting candida.tes with ·low vote shares, especially if the descent of the 
vote among the losers is smooth. Changing the way we count candidates to counting only those losers 
who secure vote comparable to that of the last winner allows us to better assess the competitiveness 
of each individual candidate. So drawing the line of "seriousness" when the fraction of the last 
winner's vote that the loser gathers drops below ·so, 67 or 50 percent respectively (same 20, 33 and 
50 percent thresholds, but applied in a different context), disregarding now closeness to the immediate 
frontrunner, yields an alternative count of the number of "serious!' candidates. As Figure 4 shows, the 
4 Taking the average number of "excess" candidates allows us to avoid separating the results for 
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 member districts - something that both Reed and Cox were forced to - being anhe 
same time consistent with our conceptualization. 
6 It is worth mentioning here that our theoretical analysis predicts the equilibrium number of 
candidates of either k or k+l only if voter preferences are distributed unimodally, i.e. if the 
constituency is cohesive. This prediction does not have to hold in polarized constituencies, where k+2 
and higher numbers of candidates can compete (see Appendix). Later we show that in the 
constituencies where we are not likely to expect polarization of voter preferences, the average number 
of candidates in the race is indeed much lower than in the districts where polarization is most likely, 
and basically stays at k+l or below. 
· 
Notice also that the decline in the number of candidates across time is much less evident than 
Reed asserts on the basis of "effective" counts. If learning and adjusting to the peculiarities of SNTV 
occur, it most probably occurred in the period 1947-1958.
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average number of excess candidates moves closer to predicted "one or below" level for stronger 
thresholds. However, there is no dramatic difference between the graphs generated by this and the 
previous, less favorable measure (compare Figures 3 and 4). This fact points at the existence of an 
actual gap between the candidates in the race, and indicates that steady decline in the vote outside 
the set of winners does not occur frequently. 
Differences in the losers' competitiveness depending on their ranks: To illuminate what happens 
to candidates' vote shares after all seats are filled, consider Figures 5a to 5d, which show how the vote 
for each successive loser (the k+l8t, k+2°d, k+3rd, and k+4th candidates) is distributed as a fraction of 
the last winner's actual vote in that district. Most k+l8t candidates, as Figure 5a shows, stay close to 
the last winner. This is but another way to say that first losers are generally competitive and pose a 
serious threat to the last winners. At the same time, both k+Jrd and k+4th candidates (Figures 5c and 
Sd) concentrate at the lower end of the distribution, being thus out of the competition for seats. Of 
course, this assumes that the third and fourth losers are present in a district, and in many cases they 
are not: 592 out of 1632 observations lack the third loser, while 1106 out of 1632 lack the fourth one. 
We can conclude, then, that neither the third nor the fourth loser is likely to compete seriously for 
a seat under SNTV. 
The second loser is an intermediate case, and his electoral strength is of the greatest interest 
to us. As Figure 5b shows, the k+2°d candidates distribution is generally fairly uniform with some 
tendency toward bimodality. The left mode of this distribution corresponds to districts with the 
second loser being effectively out of competition, and constitutes evidence in favor of the prediction 
of "one or fewer" extra candidates per race. But right the mode of this distribution signals that in a. 
substantial number of races second losers are competitive and pose a threat to the last winner. Thus, 
we cannot ignore the fact that there is substantial number of k+2 candidate races in our data. At this 
point we can raise a claim that this k+2 pattern characterizes those constituencies where the 
assumptions of our model are not met. This is the issue to which we now turn. 
Separating constituencies by the type of distribution of ideal points: The data summarized by 
Figure Sb causes us to address the question: how good are the model's 'predictions when we have 
greater confidence in the restrictive assumption about voter preferences? Our assuming unimodality 
can in fact explain why our hypothesis may not hold for polarized constituencies or constituencies 
with a broad range of preferences (with a uniform portion at the mode of preference distribution). 
The appendix to this paper illustrates some equilibria with more than k+l "serious" contenders in non­
cohesive constituencies. 
A natural test, then, is to compare two samples - one formed of constituencies that are 
unlikely to be polarized, and another with more diverse or polarized preferences. Fortunately, basic 
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demographic character is one piece of information about Japanese electoral districts that is part of 
the data set. Specifically, although Japan is not ethnically or linguistically heterogeneous, we are more 
likely to find issue polarization in urban districts than in rural ones, if only because of the greater 
income, class, educational and occupational diversity found there. Hence, it is not unreasonable to 
suppose that our model will hold better in rural districts than in metropolitan ones. 
The prediction that rural districts would follow the pattern of at most k+l "serious" candidates 
closer than metropolitan ones is borne out by the data.6 The number of excess candidates competing 
in Japanese electoral districts with different demographic characteristics is plotted in Figure 6. This 
is the number obtained by the first method described in Section l ,  in which "serious" candidates are 
counted until the vote falls sharply between two adjacent candidates. The average number of excess 
candidates in rural constituencies is distinctly lower than in metropolitan ones. And surprisingly, the 
stronger the threshold used for counting "serious" candidates, the larger is the gap between rural and 
metropolitan districts. 
And if as an alternative we determine "serious" candidates by comparing their vote shares to 
the share of the "weakest" winner, then not only does. the separation between the number of 
candidates in rural and metropolitan constituencies persist, but the number of excess candidates in 
rural constituencies settles firmly a't the k+l' predfotect·mark, regardless or' the threshold we use (see 
Figure 7).7 
Finally, and in accord with hypothesis H2, if we now analyze the relative strength of the k+2nd
candidate (i.e. the second loser) in rural and metropolitan constituencies, we get two distinct 
distributions. As Figure 8 shows, in rural districts most such candidates do not pose effective 
competition for the kth seat (conforming to the hypothesis of at most k+l true competitors in the 
race). In metropolitan constituencies, on the other hand, the k+2n� candidate is generally a competitor 
for a seat. 
4. CANDIDATE VOTE SHARES
A direct comparison of Hl and H2: Counting the number of candidates alone is not sufficient 
to discriminate between Hl an H2. Although k-candidate races are allowed only under hypothesis H2,
6 As a null hypothesis we take equal probability of k+( > 1) candidate races in both rural and 
metropolitan districts. This hypothesis is firmly rejected already at the 98% confidence interval. 
Probability of a k+( > 1) candidate race in a metropolitan district exceeds the one in a rural district 
by at least 20%.
7 What the test of hypotheses described above is concerned, its result sustains when alternative 
measure is used. 
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there is still a pooling effect of both models with respect to the k+J-candidate elections. However, 
some separation is achieved if we consider the relationships between the vote for certain candidates: 
Cox's model predicts that the vote shares of the 1•t and kth candidates will be approximately equal 
(part B of H 1), whereas the candidate-based model sets little restriction on the relative vote of 
winners (part B of H2).8 On the other hand, the candidate-based model requires that the kth and 
k+1•t candidates in the k+J-candidate elections be "close". 
To assess these predictions Figure 9 presents the corresponding ratios of the vote, where the 
average ratio of the k+1•t vote to the kth is computed conditionally on an electoral districts having 
more than k "serious" candidates in them (ratios are computed for each of the "seriousness" thresholds 
used in the previous section). But even if we do not control for the k-candidate districts, the vote for 
the kth and for the k+l8t candidates stay closer together on average than do the votes within the set 
of winning candidates. 
The dynamics of these two vote ratios is meaningful: the first, vk/v1, says how prudent voters 
are in allocating their vote; the other, vk+l /vk, indicates how precisely the candidates evaluate their 
chances. when deciding about entering the con�est. We can suppose that whichever side - voters or 
candidates - produces the faster convergence to the predicted level is the faster learner and, 
potentially' the Stackelberg leader in tlie game. As nothing prevents u� from having both candidates 
and voters being strategic, it then becomes important to kno"". who learns their equilibrium strategies 
first, and who thereby sets the structure of the system that then persists in future elections. 
Accommodating a populist vote: The counter argument to using the described vote ratios as 
evidence for or against the two competing theories is that the kth and 1'it candidates usuaJly are more 
than one step apart. In other words, unlike the k+l8t and the kth, these candidates are not by definition 
immediately close to each other. Moreover, we should be concerned that the J8t-ranked candidate 
assumes that position because of some special, non-spatial appeal. The argument in either case would 
be that relying on the ratios vk /v1 and vk+l;vk biases our conclusions against Cox's analysis. 
Thus, to reduce the potential impact of a heavy "populist" vote for the leading winner, suppose 
we compare the drop in the vote between v1 and vk versus the corresponding drop between v2 and vk.
Depicted in Figure IO, the difference in these two ratios confirms that, indeed, frontrunners collect 
8 The only restriction is that their vote should not differ more than twice (for small � - if � goes 
up, so does the allowed variation in the vote). 
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a disproportionate share of the vote. But even recalculated this way, the ratio of the vote within the 
set of winners remains below the ratio vk+l /vk.9
5. THE EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN
Number of candidates: Returning to our original count of "serious" candidates (when we count 
all candidates before the first substantial drop in the vote among the losers), we now see (Figures 11,
12) that, although less stable, a pattern similar to the one we observe in Japan arises in Taiwan as
well.10 This regularity in SNTV elections - one extra competitor over the district size - can again 
be taken as evidence in favor of H2 and a candidate-based model. This is especially so if we recall 
that every Taiwanese election corresponds essentially to an alteration in electoral regime - for the first 
three elections it was the gradual change in restrictions on campaigning; for the two later cases, 
disruption derived from the drastic changes in district boundaries and district magnitudes as well as 
the rules on allowable campaigns. 
This regime instability sugge.sts that we cannot expect to infer much here about learning by 
candidates and voters. However, it seems that the statistics generated by a 20% and a 33% criterion 
quickly settle close to the predicted number of candidates, while statistics generated by the 50%
criterion, although starting· high, rapidly approach the other two. This circumstance points in the 
direction of "quantitative" rather than "qualitative" learni�g. Namely, the number of "serious" 
candidates does not change much over time, while the gap in votes between them as a group and the 
others in the race deepens. Slow descent of the vote in early Taiwanese elections suggests that the 
second measure of the number of "serious" competitors - 'Counting those candidates whose vote is 
comparable to the minimal winning vote in their districts - may produce results more consistent across 
different thresholds. This expectation is confirmed by Figure 13. When we only count losers whose 
vote is comparable to the minimal winning vote in their district, the number of excess candidates stays 
mostly at the predicted "one or below" for the 20 percent threshold, and all three thresholds generate 
comparable numbers. 
9 Another place to use the per seat decline in the vote is to see if there is a discontinuity in the 
safety of the k-l8t and the kth candidates that reflects the fact that one is "safe" while the other is 
under the pressure of the competition. In fact, we find the vote ratio of the kth to the k-l8t vote 
slightly lower than the ratio of the first loser's to the last winner's vote when k-candidate races are 
excluded from the sample. The null hypothesis that the two ratios are the same can be rejected in 
favor of the hypothesis that the ratio of the vote for two weakest winners is lower than the one of the 
vote for the first looser to the vote for the last winner. Taking into account the higher denominator 
of the first ratio, this translates into substantially greater decline of the vote in absolute terms between 
the two last winners, than on the edge of the set of winning candidates. 
10 Taiwanese electoral data are courtesy of Professor Emerson Niou, Duke University. 
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The difference between the two ways of counting candidates, then, is much greater in Taiwan 
than in Japan. However, an interesting feature of at least the first three Taiwanese elections (1980,
1983, and 1986), is that no institutionalized (party) alternative to the Kuomintang existed, which 
implied minimal coordination within the opposition with respect to entry and campaigns. Hence, a 
large number of unaffiliated candidates could run, with each of them likely to either miscalculate his 
chances or to act in pursuit of non-electoral goals. Indeed, unlike Japanese elections between 1958
and 1993, candidate participation is high in Taiwan. Nevertheless, if one ignores crowds of non­
serious candidates, the same pattern emerges as in Japan. The fact that electoral districts were so few 
at that time (eight, returning to ten candidates each), allows us to look at the by-district dynamics. 
The 20% drop occurs fairly early, and districts display some stability in terms of the number of 
"serious" excess candidates that is unrelated to the overall number of "actual" candidates in those 
districts (see Addendum to Part 1 ).
Distribution of votes: As with the number of "serious" candidates, Taiwanese elections generate 
a pattern similar to the one we observe in Japan in terms of candidates' relative strengths. Figure 14 
shows the relatio.n between the vote for differently ranked candidates. Recall that to correspond to
our analytical predictions, the ratios of the vote should be close to one on the boundary of the set of 
winners (i.e. the first loser should have nearly as many votes, as. tlie last winner), and somewhere 
below one within the set of winners (the first and last winners can have electoral support of 
substantially different size). In contrast, the implications of Cox's strategic voter model are met if the 
ratio of the vote within the set of winners is approximately one, and somewhere (although not 
necessarily "drastically") below orie on tlie boundary of the set of winners. In fact, the values of 
various vote ratios stay close to the values we report for Japan, thereby reinforcing our conclusion 
about the superior performance of a candidate-based model.11 .
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR PARTY SYSTEMS UNDER SNTV
It follows from our theoretical analysis that candidates within a district have considerable 
incentive to coordinate strategies. Neither a mechanism of enforcement nor ad hoc cooperative 
assumptions are needed to explain the potentially coherent behavior among the winning candidates. 
11 Cox's vote ratio within the set of winners equals about .6, which is below the number for Japan. 
But Taiwanese electoral districts are on average larger, and, therefore, the ranks of the candidates 
being compared by this ratio are further apart. Elimination of the most popular candidate in each 
district (to neutralize any extreme populist vote) does not change the results as sharply as it did in 
Japan, but one explanation may be the lower number of nationally renown politicians competing in 
districts. And as in Japanese case, the ratio of the vote for the first loser to the vote for the last 
winner stays fairly high, averaging to 0.91 across elections. 
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The mutual goal of safe winners is to deter entry and, thus, to preserve the status-quo. And, at least 
in theory, all but one winning candidate are safe winners in equilibrium, while the candidates who 
are to become the last winner and the first loser cannot improve their situation as they already occupy 
the best available locations. 
The existence of strong national parties then, even if they participate only by nominating or 
endorsing candidates, obscures the picture of within-district electoral competition. Indeed, the reason 
why candidates would play cooperatively in a non-cooperative ganie is the satiation they achieve once 
they have secured seats for themselves, as no single candidate can aspire to more than one seat. The 
common interest of candidates in a district pushes them to coordinate their actions across party lines, 
rather than to seek a partisan expansion. This is not true for parties. Parties may have candidate-like 
incentives only if they are unlikely to place more that one candidate per district in.to the parliament.
Once parties become sufficiently strong to attempt an increase of the number of seats they control 
in the district, implicit cooperation among the set of winning candidates is threatened. National 
parties can introduce challengers in the districts that not only jeopardize the safety of their 
incumbents, but ·through the national campaign can disrupt equilibria in "unchallenged" districts as 
well. 
For this reason factionalism in the iapanese· party system may have been stabilizing, since 
factions would normally have not more than one candidate per district, and would resist nominations 
from their own party that could diminish the security of their candidates. Factions can also distance 
themselves from a party campaign if that campaign is not to their advantage. 
Another feature of Jap·anese elections is the existence of independent candidates who are · 
endorsed by one or more than one party. Their presence can also be viewed as a manifestation of the 
gap between district-level and national-level politics. Namely, a structure of voter preferences at the 
district level at odds with the national picture may require substantial adjustments in party political 
platforms, so that an independent candidate endorsed by the party would do better. Alternatively, the 
distribution of voter ideal points may be unusually "thin" where party platforms are spatially 
concentrated. As a consequence this residual vote has to be taken care of in cooperation with other 
parties through joint nomination of an independent candidate, so as not to invite organized entry. 
Another important relationship - between parties and voters - is modified as well by the 
electoral imperatives generated by SNTV. SNTV provides strong incentives for parties to coordinate 
voter strategies within a district. Indeed, as we have seen in our theoretical development (Part I of this 
essay), successful candidates (and their respective local party organizations), once they anticipate 
enough support to win a seat, should be primarily concerned with preserving a "properly structured" 
competition within the district. Theoretically at least, electorally-minded candidates may wish to 
support other competitors in their district with some of their own vote to preserve the overall balance. 
13 
Alternatively, candidates may find it useful to suppress their own turnout so as to make entry less 
attractive. Either way, we are talking about candidates manipulating the effective distribution of 
voter preferences, which can be done if parties can influence voters strategies. 
This later possibility, then - that parties might be the instruments of influencing the 
observable distribution of voter preferences - suggests yet another role for parties. Suppose, for a 
given district magnitude and preference distribution, that no equilibrium campaign configuration 
exists. We know, however, that for some derivative preference distribution - after adjustments in 
turnout, for instance - there may be an equilibrium. Parties then may be a tool for "correcting 
imperfections" in the distribution of preferences so as to generate a favorable equilibrium - one that 
maintains the viability of almost all incumbent politicians. 
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APPENDIX 
DEPARTING FROM SOME ASSUMPTIONS: POLARIZED PREFERENCES 
Part I of this essay does not treat cases of complex electoral preferences within districts, such 
as non-spatial issues or bimodally or multimodally distributed spatial preferences. Instead we assume 
that voter ideal points are unimodally distributed over the single-dimensional policy. But this 
assumption may not be met in many electoral districts included in our data. Voter preferences in some 
districts may correspond to this assumption closer than in the others. As was mentioned earlier, the 
structure of competition appears significantly different in rural and metropolitan constituencies. We 
believe that rural constituencies correspond better to our assumptions, and in fact the predictions of 
our model are met closer in those districts. 
Even though we are not in the position to give an exhaustive description of what might 
happen in the non-unimodal cases, we can offer examples of equilibria for certain special 
distributions, that may prove generalizable - notably, some bimodal (polarized) distributions and 
quasi-concave configurations that begin to approximate� uniform distribution. 
In Part I we establish the existence of k+l equilibria (k odd) for all symmetric unimodal 
distributio'ns and for distributions that approximate them ,;sufficiently closely". And although we· do 
not know whether equilibria exist for other unimodal distributions, we know that if they exist, they 
cannot be but of the same form - either k, or k+l with two tied candidates at the mode. 
Now there are certain things that we can say about the number of candidates in polarized 
(bimodal) constituencies. First, building on the above mentioned result, if the distribution of voter 
preferences is bimodal and symmetric, as well as symmetric around each mode, then at least for 
k=4a+l (where a is a positive integer) a k+l equilibrium exists (see Figure A l ). Without symmetry 
around each mode, a k+l equilibrium may exist that looks like the configuration in Figure A2. Figures 
A3 and A4 illustrate k+2 equilibria. Note, that the configuration in Figure A4 is simply a combination 
of two k+l equilibria for unimodal distributions. Note also that the same configuration is an 
equilibrium if district magnitude is five, six or seven. 
The intermediate case between a strict unimodal distribution and a polarized (bi-modal) 
constituency occurs when the preference distributions has a flat region for a mode. In this case the 
number of candidates in excess of k that compete ih equilibrium depends on the size of the district 
and the specific form of the distribution, because as we know from Part I, a uniform preference 
distribution can support a great variety of equilibria configurations. The existence of finite slopes in 
/( x) and how candidates respond to them restrict this variety. Figures A5 and A6 illustrate the k+ 1 
and k+3 equilibria. 
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Figure 1. Allernalhe Hypotheses Generated by Volrr-Based (HI - Cox 1993) and 
Candi da le-Based Models 
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Figure 5. Performance of Differently Ranked Losers Relatively to Their Districts' 
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Different Demographic Types - Japan 
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Figure S .  Second Loser' s Vote as a Percentage of the Last Winner's Vote - Japan 
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Figure 9.  Comparison of Ht and H2 i n  Terms o f  Vote Dynamics 
(/) Q) 
8 0.9 ·············
·
·
--
·
-·
··
·
··
-
·
·
·
··
""""'"'"'"::::
·
�:::-�:
·
:::
·
·:·: .. =::·�-"""""""""' .......................................... - ........................ ;·;:.::""""""'' . .  . 
� �--=----··-... �.·�===.·��������::.: .... �:::� 
Q) 0.8 .....
.
...................... -......... _,,, ___ ,, .. 
,
. .
.
.............. 
_
,,
,
,
,
, .. ..
.
............
.
.
.
...
.
.
....
.
.......
.
..
..
............... -..
.
. --..... -..........................................................
. 
. 
+> 
� 
Q) 0. 7 .............. : ................. _.,,,, ...... _,, __ .... ,,.......................................................................... .. ................... .............
..
.
.......
.
........
.
...
.
............. 
.
. 
..c: 
+> 
(+..( 0. 6 ·········-
.. 
-····
·
··
-
-·····
·
·
·
·
·
· 
.. 
·
··
- ---
·
·
····
·
·
·
·
-··
··
·
·
··
·
···
·
· 
0 
0 � 0.5 _,;, _____ ,, _ _  ,,_, _ ___ _ ,,,, ____ ... ,, .... ,,_,,,,,_,,, 
_
__ ,,,,,,,,,_,_,,,, __ ,, .....
.
..... -.... -............................... . 
0.4.-'-.---,.�-,-�..---..�--.-_:___.,........--,.�.:.....-�.,.......:.--,.�-t-�.,........J1 9581 960 1 9631 967 1 969 1 9721 976 1 979 1 980 1 983 1 986 1 990 1 993 
years of elections 
- d. 
-2 
- 3  
·
- 4
1 - ratio of the vote withi n the set of winners - Cox 1 993 (Hl: kt;h /first= I) 
ratio of the vote for the first l oser to the vote for the l as t  winner: 
2 - in all races; 
i n  competitive races 
3 - when the first l oser i s  not more than 20% behind the l ast winner; 
4 - when the first l oser i s  not more than 50% behi nd the l ast winner. 
26 
Figure 1 0 .  Comparison of H l  and H2 Controlled for the Popul ist vote - Japan 
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Figure 1 1 .  Locat ion of t he First 33% Decl ine in t he Vote Outside the Set of 
Winners - Taiwan 
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Fi gure 1 2. Average Number of "Seri ous" Candid ates per Race in Excess of the 
District Size - Tai wan 
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Figure 1 3. Average Number of "Competitive" Losers per Race - Taiwan 
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winning vote; 
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Figure 14 .  Comparison o f  HI and H2 ( Vote Ratios) - Tai w an Data 
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Figure A. Examples of Eq uilibria Configurations for Some Non-Cohesive 
Preference Distribut ions 
A.l : Example of a k+l equilibrium 
existence for the case of
district magnitude k=5.
A·3 : Example of a k+2 equilibrium
existence. 
AS : Possibility of a k+l equilibrium
when distribution of preferences 
has a flat portion on the top. 
3 2  
A2 : Example of a k+l equilibrium 
existence for the case of
district magnitude k=3.
A4: k+2 Equilibrium as a combination 
of two k+l equilibria. 
J'\.6 : Possibility of a 
k+l equilibrium when 
distribution of preferences 
has a flat portion on the top. 
k=4
